Is the Cyprus problem paradigm changing?
The Geneva meeting might have achieved more than what it seems at first sight
“Family photo” of the meeting in Geneva on 17-18 March 2025. Source: UN.
The “informal” five-party meeting in Geneva on 17-18 March meeting comprised the UN Secretary-General plus the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and the UK. As I don’t want to clog this article up with “Cyprob” background, here are the names of the key attendees; here is the UN Secretary-General on what was agreed on 18 March; here is a very short list of the classic Cyprus problem issues; here are some historical documents; and here is a very good short book on the whole background of the Cyprus problem written by James Ker-Lindsay (disclosure: he is a friend), published by Oxford University Press. It was published in 2011. But as the saying goes, “Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose”.
The results of the “informal” five-party meeting in Geneva on 17-18 March were greeted with a mixed reception by friends and contacts in what one might loosely call the “pro-peace space”.
One quite vocal corner of the pro-peace space saw the meeting as a total failure: nothing that announced was new, the argument went; they had been promising these things, or at least talking about them, for months or even years; it’s all a fig leaf to cover up that fact that there was no progress on getting back to the table to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the bizonal bicommunal federation (BBF), which is mandated by the UN Security Council.
Another corner saw it as better than expected, given that expectations had been managed via various messages to expect simply an agreement to meet again and maybe one or two new crossing points across the UN-monitored buffer zone. The last five-party meeting in 2021 had also been a bit of a car crash, so even avoiding that was good news. Among other things there will be a new envoy (possibly dubbed a “personal envoy”, like the last time); four new crossing points are due to be announced; and it looks as though some other stalled issues, such as cooperation on photovoltaics in the buffer zone, de-mining and some technical committees, will now make progress.
My personal view is that it might turn out to be important for an entirely different reason. Maybe I am reading too much into it. But I think it might just be the beginning of new paradigm—a shift in the conversation away from the old, failed ways of trying to bring peace to this island to something that might actually work.
Let me try and explain what I mean.
Stuck on an old and failed negotiations design
Since the breakdown of high-level talks at the Swiss resort of Crans Montana in July 2017, or certainly since 2020, efforts to bring peace to Cyprus have been stuck on the following.
The Turkish Cypriot leader and president of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Ersin Tatar, who was elected in October 2020, has rejected a federal model for solving the Cyprus problem and insisted on two states, or, at the very least, recognition of the “sovereign equality” of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has also generally followed this line, although there are some who say it is less ideological than Mr Tatar about it.
The official position of the Greek Cypriot leader and president of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, and all his predecessors, is to reject two states, even though there are multiple reports that his predecessor aired the idea of two states around the end of Crans Montana. The official line is to support a BBF but one often hears the view that the de facto preferred position of successive leaderships is to cling onto to a deteriorating status quo, while conducting “negotiations without end”.
The official UN mandate from UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 2771 of 31 January 2025, is for a “bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in relevant Security Council resolutions, including paragraph 4 of its resolution 716 (1991).” (For the geeks, paragraph 4 of Resolution 716 basically defines the (much argued about) concept of political equality, by endorsing a definition contained in an annex of page 7 of a Secretary-General report of 1990.) As Cyprus is one of the very few subjects of convergence among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, US), no one wants to change the BBF language.
A genuine fear of those who are in favour of a solution that, if you change the way you try to negotiate long-term peace on this island, you will lose all the “acquis” (things agreed upon in principle, on the basis of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”). For this reason this cohort is even sceptical of a process that would truly engage voters in proposing or presenting solutions.
Because of 4), an assumption that to achieve the BBF outlined in 3) you have to approach it the same way as you have done for decades: in that same way that has failed again and again. All it needs is a smart leader, or a push from this or that foreign power, and a deal will be done and everyone will vote in favour.
I used to believe in 5). I have now changed my mind. For various reasons, including a more authoritarian direction in Turkey, and also the message drip-dripped to Greek Cypriots that a federal solution would mean foreign powers in their government, I don’t think you will ever get Greek Cypriot support for any kind of power-sharing settlement.
Not, that is, unless you take a step-by-step approach to a settlement, which I shall talk about more in a moment.
No place for security risks in the new world order
The 1-5 situations above mean that we have been stuck with “Cyprob” stagnation since October 2020. This has meant rising security risks, especially in 2023-24, as I wrote about here. They have included increasing military incursions and violations of the buffer zone; head-on clashes in the buffer zone; Greece-Turkey naval stand-offs over the Great Sea Interconnector; and, because of stagnation on the solar plant among others, no energy cooperation that might actually have shielded us all from the risk of long blackouts this summer.
And all of this is happening at a time when the old world order is being turned upside down. This threatens the security of all those present at the meeting. If there is a big flare-up because of the “Cyprob”, for example, no one can depend on the US any more to run in and fix it all, as it has many times in the past.
This is why I wonder whether the unspoken agreement in Geneva, which probably involved exerting a certain amount of pressure on participants from Cyprus, was to “park” any talk of BBF for the time being, ban all talk of two states and focus only on measures to improve the atmosphere among the main players—Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece.
In my ideal scenario, this agreement to keep on talking will organically lead to more and more cooperation, which eventually leads to a step-by-step solution—the only kind of solution I think Greek Cypriots would now vote for. (I also hope it involves real engagement of voters. But that is an article for another day.)
Until now, as I have written elsewhere, Greek Cypriots have always rejected the step-by-step approach because of fears relating to the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus in the new state of affairs and because of fears of recognition of a breakaway entity.
But in today’s turbulent world, on an island coveted by foreign armies for millennia, they arguably face a much bigger existential threat. Perhaps a step-by-step solution should start to be seen as the best path for survival, not only for Greek Cypriots but for Turkish Cypriots too.
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To solve a problem, both sides first need to agree on what the problem actually is.
As far as I can tell, for Greek Cypriots, their position is that part of their land was invaded by and continues to be occupied by Turkey for reasons which are questionable at best, but in general, without any reason whatsoever. All they ask is that Turkish troops and civilians - including those born in Cyprus to mainland Turkish parents - need to leave. The Turkish Cypriots should then accept to return under the legitimate government of Republic of Cyprus and live as a protected minority, with the minority rights which befit their numbers. Greek Cypriots should then be free to move to former homes and lands and all Cyprus should return to being a unitary state, but with 1 person/1 vote; which is their most reasonable understanding of political equality and democracy.
The Turkish Cypriot position is that the Republic of Cyprus was formed as a partnership state of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together. That neither community could or should rule the other. And that this agreement was enshrined in the Cyprus constitution and was protected by the 3 Guarantor Powers. They are of the view that this partnership has ceased to exist since the first of Greek Cypriots armed attacks in December 1963 - and the subsequent takeover of the RoC Government by the Greek Cypriot administration in March 64 leading to a RoC Government which totally lacked Turkish Cypriot representation - which this makes it illegal. Furthermore, the oppression of the Turkish Cypriots continued for 11 years until it finally led to the Greece-led coup d’etat of 15th July 1974, which itself prompted the legal intervention of Turkey on 20th July - which did nothing short of saving their lives. Finally, the events of 1963-74, the words of the short lived President Nicos Sampson that he “would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus” and the countless rejections of peace deals by the Greek Cypriot leadership proves that the Greek Cypriots are not prepared to relinquish the international recognition which they stole, in spite of, not because of, international law and of the constitution of Cyprus.
Somehow, the two narratives above (which will differ slightly depending on who you speak to, but which will largely hold true) need to be squared. Because again, you can only solve a problem when you first agree what the problem is.
Geneva was just another episode of the Greek Cypriot leadership kicking the can down the road, lest they be cornered and asked to make a real decision - as occurred with the Annan Plan joint referendum in 2004. They do not want to take such a risk again.
As for the Turkish Cypriot leadership, they needed to show some willing to negotiate and felt confident enough to do so by preparing a package of confidence building measures which they absolutely knew would be refused by the Greek Cypriots. Tatar also had to keep one eye on Turkish Cypriot elections in October. So couldn’t afford to be too forceful in his 2 State Solution stance. That would leave the door open to the Turkish Cypriot opposition to claim that a more positive approach may break the deadlock.
So both sides - and the UN - get to walk away claiming positive talks, while achieving the square root of nothing. The Geneva talks were not positive. Not unless you enjoy diplomatic theatre.