My 3 wishes for Cyprus envoy Holguin

There is a deal to be made but it needs diplomatic courage and consistency

May 16, 2025

My vision for a region-wide energy deal. It is time to bring it into the open.

On 12 May María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar re-started duties as the Personal Envoy (PESG) of the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, “in order to work on next steps on the Cyprus issue and advise him”. On 14 May an EU special envoy for Cyprus, Johannes Hahn, was also announced.

I have three wishes for the PESG’s tenure, which I shall elaborate on in a moment. But first let’s underline how difficult her job is going to be.

We are still years from negotiations—

Ms Holguin’s reappointment comes at a time when the “two leaders”, in Cyprus problem parlance, appear to be competing with each other over who is quickest to launch the blame game, at least based on their most recent disappointing meeting on 5 May.

It also comes when Türkiye (Turkey) seems in no mood for compromise; when it appears to be blocking progress on the Great Sea Interconnector electricity cable from Crete to Cyprus; when the Republic of Cyprus is reportedly blocking the desired interconnector from Turkey to northern Cyprus; and when it is irking Turkish Cypriots and Turkey by jailing (so far) non-Turkish Cypriots who have marketed and sold Greek Cypriot property in northern Cyprus; and when elections and other political schedules will make getting to the negotiating table nigh impossible.

The election and other timetables are as follows.

In October 2025 there will be elections for the president of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Regardless of who wins, this could be followed by early parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus.
In January-June 2026 the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) holds the rotating presidency of the EU—something which triggered the suspension of official Cyprus problem negotiations the last time the ROC held the EU presidency in 2012.
In May 2026 the Republic of Cyprus holds parliamentary elections.
By April 2027 Greece is due to hold parliamentary elections.
By May 2028 Turkey is due to hold presidential elections.

Given these obstacles, it is no surprise that I am asked fairly frequently why we have a UN envoy at all, even if it is a different type of envoy from the previous Special Advisers to the Secretary-General (SASG), who were charged with running a formal negotiations process.

—but international politics means talking is a “must-have”

The simplest answer is because the Secretary-General wants it. The more complex answer is a combination of several elements that have a bearing on Cyprus.

US funding cutbacks means that there is a new and credible risk to UN missions. This could include the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) if the US suddenly decides to veto UNFICYP’s renewal in January 2026. If UNFCYP were to leave, my assumption is that Turkey would take the currently UN-monitored buffer zone. Until it reached the British bases of Dhekelia or Akrotiri, the only thing standing in the way of Turkey taking more territory would be the small Republic of Cyprus National Guard.
Ongoing conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean (Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Syria in alphabetical order).
Ongoing war in Ukraine.
Recent shocks to the EU-US relationship following tariffs and the Munich conference in February.
The risk of a hard right shift in multiple EU member states.

Under these circumstances, the argument goes, no one can afford a security accident because of Cyprus. Therefore, talking, even with an “informal” label, and even when it seems that it is just for the sake of talking, is seen not just as a “nice-to-have” but as a “must-have”. One can imagine that at least some of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, US) have made this argument to Mr Guterres.

A sceptic would say that this means the international community has slipped into simply “managing” the Cyprus problem and has given up on trying to solve it. But Ms Holguin is an intelligent person and smart politician, credited with playing a decisive role in bringing an end to a much more bloody conflict in Columbia.

Assuming that Ms Holguin’s intentions are more ambitious than just “managing” the old Cyprob, these are my three wishes for what the reappointed PESG might achieve.

Wish #1: get buy-in to update the peace process…

You have heard me bang on about this before. Look at the election timetable above. When there are essentially four players involved, there will always be an election coming. It is a structural problem: a leader-led process was, is and always will be doomed to fail.

Yet we know from countless surveys that citizens on both sides are far more flexible than their leaders, even when details are added to specific proposals. (See short podcast here, especially minute 12:55, and Charis Psaltis’ new Substack here, where he is gradually detailing surveys over time.)

…it will help address the crisis in democracy…

We also know that democracy is in crisis everywhere, because citizens feel out of touch with politicians. I would say from the Eurobarometer below that the situation in Cyprus is critical. If we do not do something to mend the relationship between citizens and governments, then the anti-democratic parties take over and the world as we know it is finished.

Image source: European Union Standard Eurobarometer 102, Autumn 2024

…and one can address the sceptics

We therefore need political party support for serious citizens’ involvement in decision-making in general and in any new negotiations process in particular. For those who shout, “Not possible; this is Cyprus” let me say a few things.

OF COURSE participants would not be chosen by me, nor diplomats, nor people in the peacebuilding space, but by professionals, using tried and tested, internationally accepted norms for creating a randomly selected, representative group of citizens.
OF COURSE it would follow international guidelines from institutions like the OECD (which now has a database of 733 citizens’ assemblies conducted across the world) or DemocracyNext, a pioneer in citizens’ assemblies, for how to run an assembly.
OF COURSE the politicians would have a say in what the assemblies get to deliberate about. (In an ideal scenario citizens actually decide this, but we do need to be realistic about what politicians might support.) Should the question be simply, “How do we revise the negotiations process in a way that meaningfully engages citizens?” Or should it be the thorny questions, like, “Will there be a rotating presidency and will guarantors lose their intervention rights?”
OF COURSE members of the group, who would deliberate over weeks or months over specific questions, might be subject to interference from outside if the very notion of a citizens’ assembly does not have the buy-in of the biggest political parties.
OF COURSE it will be difficult to get that political party buy-in (and the buy-in of the peacebuilding community, not all of whom are comfortable with ordinary folk having a say).
OF COURSE you will need lots of iterations (‘practice’ and ‘proof of concept’) before you will get that buy-in. That is why I have been working with the Cyprus Peace and Dialogue Centre (CPDC) in doing those iterations—in learning by doing—rather than trying to appear clever by carping from the sidelines. (Yes, you guessed, I am riled by the all-too easy path of the sceptic.)

Wish #2: obtain agreement that we need a regional energy deal

Even if my first wish is granted, the absence of trust, and the lack of agreement on what an end-game might even look like, means that we are still years away from fully fledged negotiations. We need some new ideas to build trust and thereby reduce the risk of flare-ups in the region. The only ideas that I believe have a chance of working are ones that bring security benefits beyond just Cyprus.

That means an energy deal involving electricity interconnectors that link Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey and Egypt, and potentially joint Cyprus-Israel natural gas infrastructure from which Turkey can also benefit. (See map above, which I have been hawking around privately for some years now.)

Everyone in the region needs this deal.

Cyprus has the best solar profile in Europe. It could be a net exporter of electricity. And yet it had blackouts in the winter month of February and, as I wrote here, I am fearful for the summer. Cyprus is the last energy-isolated country in the EU and yet it thinks it can attract investment from big tech for energy-intensive data centres. It desperately needs to get rid of its energy isolation through interconnectors that are currently being blocked. As noted above, Turkey is apparently physically blocking the interconnector from Crete to Cyprus and Cyprus and Greece are said to be legally blocking, via the European grid organization, ENTSO-E, the interconnector from Turkey to Cyprus.
Israel needs to diversify its natural gas export markets. I understand that is uncomfortable about relying only on Egypt for gas exports and primarily on Chevron for gas production. Moreover, Israel-based gas platforms remain a potential target for attacks. Israel could either hook up with Cyprus to produce natural gas from the Republic of Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Or Israel could potentially sell electrons, produced using gas-fired power stations, via electricity interconnectors. After a long freeze in relations, Israel has started tentative talks with Turkey about Syria, so it is not impossible that Israel could agree to a regional deal involving Turkey.
Turkey is investing in diversifying its energy sources. It is already a player for gas, because of the pipelines that cross its territory. Electricity cables linking Cyprus and Israel and/or gas pipelines from Israel/Cyprus will help it diversify.
Greece became a net exporter of energy in 2024, so it is already an energy player in electricity; it is also trying to be one in liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the port of Alexandropoulis. Joint Cyprus-Israel infrastructure will help it achieve these goals.
Egypt is a net energy importer, with huge demand for energy—whether that comes as electricity from Greece or comes as natural gas from Israel or Cyprus. Like Cyprus, it also needs a lot of energy-hungry desalination plants, therefore the more electricity it can get from Greece, or gas from Israel/Cyprus, the better. Why do I add Egypt into the mix? Because it will make Greek Cypriots feel a little safer when dealing with Turkey. Plus, it is good for wider regional security to address Egypt’s energy and water needs.

There is a deal to be made here. But it needs diplomatic courage and consistency to make it happen. I am encouraged that the EU has taken the challenge seriously enough to appoint their own envoy.

Wish #3: be wise to age-old tricks

If I am honest I only invented this one so that I had the traditional three wishes. I thought of calling it “cut the cr*p”—a phrase used by my eldest brother, which essentially means: ‘I know that you are talking rubbish so don’t try to deceive me.’

The various players on the Cyprus problem have honed this art for decades and have seen off many an international diplomat. My wish is that Ms Holguin is wise to their age-old tricks and does not get waylaid by them.

If you want my premium monthly in-depth product, check out Sapienta Country Analysis Cyprus and other deep-dive reports here. And if you can’t afford that but want the executive summary only for just €100/year, you can find that here on Substack, at Cyprus Pocket Brief.

Or keep these articles and hugely labour-intensive videos coming by supporting this publication, Sapienta Cyprus Snippets, for just €49 per year.