The unspoken by-product of warmer Cyprus-US relations
It has big implications for what kind of Cyprus settlement is possible
Re-sending on the same day of publication - 17 January 2025 - to correct some errors, apologies!
Last week I wrote about the ever-closer relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the US. Just a few days later, relations took another step closer as the US authorized defence equipment, supplies and services to Cyprus.
In my article last week, I said that the new relationship was good for Cyprus’ international reputation and good for the economy. On the other hand, I also said:
“However, this new relationship with the US also means a massive change to what is possible when it comes to solving, or ending, the Cyprus problem.”
This week, I am going to try to explain what I mean. Bear with me, as it is a longer- than-usual article.
Security questions in the Cyprus problem negotiations
In the decades of UN-facilitated negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the critical questions in the security “chapter” have always been the following.
Will Turkey/Türkiye reduce the number of troops stationed on the island? In negotiations so far, the working assumption has always been yes.
Assuming yes, how fast will troop numbers be cut? In the 2004 Annan Plan, troop numbers for both Greece and Turkey would have dropped to 6,000 by 2011 (within six years), to 3,000 by 2018 and then 950 troops from Greece and 650 troops from Turkey thereafter, “with the objective of total withdrawal”.
Will the number eventually get to zero? The Greek Cypriot desire has always been “yes”. The historical position of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots can be roughly translated as “it depends”. In both the Annan Plan and the high-level Crans Montana talks in 2017, troop numbers would be subject to review after a certain period.
Will Turkey, Greece and the UK retain their rights of unilateral intervention under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee? The Greek Cypriot desire has always been “no”. Under a great deal of international pressure, Turkey looked like it might be prepared to drop guarantees at the high-level talks in Crans Montana in 2017, subject to certain other commitments from the Greek Cypriots, such as a rotating presidency of the united federal republic. There are of course conflicting narratives on what really went on and what Turkey was really prepared to do. But I think there are few disagreements over the fact that the notion of abolishing guarantees was seriously discussed for the first time ever in the history of Cyprus problem negotiations.
Turkish troops have always been a big issue—
Among the many reasons given by the former Republic of Cyprus president, Nicos Anastasiades, and his supporters for “Crash Montana” was that there was no hard answer to the question, “when will the last Turkish soldier leave?”. This question was due to be answered when the presidents and prime ministers of the guarantor powers Greece, Turkey and the UK got together. They never did meet. And the rest is history.
I describe these events in order to underline that Turkish troops have historically been a big issue for Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot core and oft-repeated official description of the Cyprus problem is that it is one of “invasion and occupation”, whereas Turkish Cypriots generally see it as a by-product of Greek Cypriot attempts to change the constitution in 1963, followed by the two communities falling out and starting to kill each other, or the coup inspired by Greece in 1974.
—de facto US bases means Turkey will never leave
The big change now is that we are going to have the US military on the island. The government is at pains to emphasize that these will not be US bases as such. Nevertheless, the Andreas Papandreou airbase in Paphos and the Mari naval base near Limassol are getting an upgrade, with reports that they will be up to NATO standard.
Whether or not they are official US bases, what happens to Turkish troops when the US military comes to the island? I think the answer is obvious, albeit painful for Greek Cypriots to hear. It means that Turkey will never leave. Turkey will argue that if the US (and increasingly, France) are allowed to bring their military (plus the British with their own Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs)), why should Turkey be asked to leave in any future settlement of the Cyprus problem?
Even without those arguments, you only have to look at Syria and Iraq, and disputes with Greece over the Aegean, to understand that Turkey feels it has to have a physical presence in its near abroad in order to feel secure. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not defending this policy; I am just saying this is how it is and how I believe Turkey views it.
What scenarios could be possible for solution of the Cyprus problem?
That brings me my other point, which is what kind of settlement or end to the Cyprus problem is going to be possible if troops are such a big issue for Greek Cypriots and if Turkish troops are never going to leave? Given how often the Republic of Cyprus president, Nikos Christodoulides, mentions his desire to join NATO, I see a few scenarios.
Scenario 1: united island and NIABuN (NATO in all but name). Cyprus is united under a very loose federation. There are lots of armies on the island but they are all NATO so the “Turkish troops” issue loses its sting for Greek Cypriots. Does a united Cyprus join NATO? The most common argument against this is that the second largest party in parliament, the nominally communist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), will never allow it. AKEL received only 2.1 more percentage points in the European Parliament election last June than the YouTuber who won a seat, Fidias Panayiotou, so one might argue that AKEL is a spent force. But AKEL can still gather a big crowd, and its closest Turkish Cypriot counterpart, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), is also large, so I think no one will try to force NATO on AKEL and CTP. Instead, we shall have what I am dubbing “NIABuN”—NATO in all but name.
Scenario 2: an “arrangement” on the Cyprus problem with NIABuN. I think we shall have NATO in all but name regardless of whether or not the country is united. So Scenario 2 involves some kind of accommodation with Turkey, which will probably be called an “arrangement”. Perhaps it will be energy cooperation, which Turkey seems to be hinting at, and perhaps, if the Greek Cypriots can get the international community on-side, the arrangement will be sweetened by the return of the fenced off district of Varosha in the eastern Famagusta region. Under this scenario, the Cyprus problem is essentially parked forever. It isn’t solved. It suits everyone except for the Turkish Cypriots, who are left in limbo, unless this arrangement also leads to some kind of “Taiwanization” of northern Cyprus, where the Greek Cypriots do not object to other countries dealing directly with the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Scenario 3: a step-by-step solution, with NIABuN. Allow me to indulge the only version of a settlement that I think is politically feasible, even if no one seems to be listening. Turkey is unlikely to leave Turkish Cypriots in the lurch, as in Scenario 2. At the same time, far too much mistrust has been built up to get us quickly to Scenario 1, especially if we follow the old idea of a “big bang” implementation from the first day after twin referendums. The third way, therefore, is that all sides agree to a slow build-up of trust via a step-by-step solution, which again involves NATO in all but name. This probably involves beginning with something resembling Scenario 2. However, for this to happen, the Greek Cypriot political class would need to drop its opposition to a step-by-step solution, which it has always resisted because of the fear that it implies recognition of a breakaway statelet.
How does one get comfortable with a step-by-step solution?
How do you get the Greek Cypriot political class comfortable with a step-by-step solution? You ask ordinary Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots through a randomly selected, representative citizens’ assembly. Citizens’ assemblies are an increasingly popular tool in democracies for engaging citizens, making them feel heard and supporting political leaders in making difficult decisions. The OECD has recorded 733 such assemblies in recent years in 34 countries. They typically only work well if you have the political leadership on board. And in Cyprus you would need to make sure that the political parties are comfortable with the notion too.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that, through a lot of work and pilot tests and so on, we have the political parties and leaderships on board. In this scenario, you could ask two questions.
“How should citizens be engaged and informed in an eventual process for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem?” (I use “eventual” to keep certain Turkish Cypriot sceptics on board).
“Are there any parts of an agreed settlement that could be implemented in stages?”
Question 2 is currently a bit of a leading question, so would need some work to make it more neutral. But you get the idea: if citizens give their blessing to a step-by-step solution, then the Republic of Cyprus has the democratic legitimacy to go for that kind of solution: one that has many stops on the way, so that citizens in both communities can pause and reflect on whether they want to go further.
Let’s face it, with all the mistrust built up and reinforced over the years, a step-by-step solution is the only one that Greek Cypriots would ever vote for. I live in hope that it will eventually be seen by everyone as the only way to secure long-lasting peace on this island.
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