Will Turkey make an offer to Cyprus in March?
And will the Greek Cypriots be ready for it?
Image: Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan. Source: Shutterstock.
On 31 January subscribers to my monthly Sapienta Country Analysis Cyprus report received a more speculative than usual analysis about what Türkiye (Turkey) might be planning for the upcoming “five-party” meeting under UN auspices in March. I think it is rather important that this gets a more public airing, not least to avoid a nasty crash if Turkey makes an offer that is rejected—either because the Greek Cypriots are not ready for it or because Turkey misreads how Greek Cypriots will see it. I am therefore reproducing the line of argument here, in a slightly more colloquial fashion. And if you make it to the end of this post, there is a special time-limited offer of which you might want to take advantage.
What is happening?
Efforts to solve the Cyprus problem have been stagnant since the collapse of high-level talks in the Swiss resort of Crans Montana in July 2017. Since the election of Ersin Tatar as Turkish Cypriot leader and president of the unrecognized "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" in October 2020, the official position of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots has been to drop the UN Security Council-mandated "bizonal bi-communal federation (BBF)", which would unite Cyprus under a federal roof, and to push instead for a two-state solution in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot position is to stick to the BBF formula.
The result has been a stalemate. However, lately there has been an effort by the international community to bring all the main players together for what is being dubbed as an "informal" meeting. This is no doubt a by-product of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and perhaps a realization that this corner of the world is pretty unstable, therefore it might not be a good idea to let an old conflict fester, especially when there are persistent clashes in the UN-monitored buffer zone, resulting in injuries to peacekeepers, as well as other incidents. Although these episodes do not often make it to the international media, they underline the risk of more serious flare-ups between the opposing forces. One could also add that the new paradigm coming from the US also makes it imperative to reduce security risks in and around Cyprus.
Barring any unforeseen developments, a meeting will therefore take place in March, preceded by a visit to Cyprus on 10 February by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo. Although there is ongoing discussion about the capacity in which the various players at the March meeting will participate, it is understood that it will include the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and the UK. Greece, Turkey and the UK are the “guarantor powers” under the 1960 treaties that founded the Republic of Cyprus.
What did Fidan say?
In preparation for March, all the abovementioned players have been having meetings with their interlocutors: everyone is talking to the UN and presumably the UK, while the Greek Cypriots are talking to Greece and the Turkish Cypriots are talking to Turkey.
For me, the most interesting of these meetings came on 8 January, when Turkey's foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, visited Mr Tatar in northern Cyprus. First, I should note that it is quite common in Cyprus that the media on both sides will report widely on a translation of a speech given on, or by, the "other side". This can miss subtleties. For my clients, therefore, I always try to hunt down the original source and to find direct quotes of exactly what was said. This time it took hours on end of pasting what he might have said into Google Translate, then hunting for it in Turkish, to find the source with the most number of direct quotes. To save you hours of hunting yourselves, here is the best source, from Turkey’s foreign ministry.
A die-hard Cyprob cynic would say that there was nothing new in Mr Fidan’s remarks. He said that Cyprus must “continue on its path with a two-state solution” and stated the oft-repeated position of Turkey that a solution needs to reflect "existing reality"—something that tends to irk the Greek Cypriots, since they hold Turkey responsible for creating the physical division of the island.
What did he mean about cooperation?
Having laid out the usual positions, he then made an appeal to the Greek Cypriots as follows (Google-translated).
“Here, I really want to make my main appeal to the citizens and political leadership of the Greek Cypriot side. If they want to take the island of Cyprus to a more advanced, modern, developed, peaceful and secured state, they need to be brave in implementing such solutions. I invite them to be brave in this regard. I believe that people with common sense will do their best in this regard.”
This kind of opening from a Turkish official is unusual. However, he then kind of ruined it by couching the idea of cooperation as part of a two-state solution.
“After the two-state solution, the authorities and politicians with initiative on the island will come together from both sides and do their best to take the island much further. It is possible for the positive atmosphere and political climate between Greece and Turkey to resonate on the island, and for Greece, Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Administration to come together and build a better future in our region. This future was waiting for us yesterday, but we lost yesterday because we did not implement this formula. Let's not lose the future at least. Let the four sides come together and build a peaceful and serene future in our region, both in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. This will bring tremendous prosperity and peace not only to our own people, but also to the region.”
I have heard some interpret the proposal as saying Turkey is leaving the door open for a confederation-type solution. But then Mr Fidan elaborated on the offer in response to a question. Now, if Turkey is anything like Cyprus, then this question was set up in advance. Ministers sometimes make sure that a question is asked by a friendly journalist so that they can “by the by” make a particular point.
Asked whether a two-state solution was possible, Mr Fidan said the following (emphasis added).
“Even before this, my dear friends, I believe that the two sides can use areas of common interest without reaching a final solution between themselves at certain points. There are steps that can be taken by the two civilized societies, related to energy and economy, by coming together with the north and south.”
What exactly does Mr Fidan mean by cooperation on energy and economy? In my Sapienta Country Analysis report, I laid out three possibilities, with the third being the one that had at least half a chance of succeeding.
The first was the oft-failed “old chestnut”: return of the district of Varosha in Famagusta, most of which has been fenced off for decades, in return for Greek Cypriots assenting to direct flights to the unrecognized Ercan/Tymbou airport and direct trade to the EU from the unrecognized port of Famagusta in northern Cyprus. I dismissed that as too ambitious.
The second was a natural gas cooperation deal. I dismissed that as too early, given that the gas finds so far in Cronos (run by Italy’s ENI) and Aphrodite (run by Chevron of the US) are pretty certain to go to Egypt, and we do not yet know how much natural gas ExxonMobil will find in the drilling currently taking place in “Electra”, in offshore Block 5 of the Republic of Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
That left the third possibility, as follows.
“3. Electricity interconnector cooperation deal (might be possible but with caveats)
Turkey might offer cooperation on electricity cables: either the subsea electricity cable that it wants to send to northern Cyprus, or the Great Sea Interconnector, which Greece and Cyprus plan to send from Crete to Cyprus and eventually to Israel (see Energy and structural reforms), or perhaps a deal on both cables. Such a deal would probably also involve Greece, given that Greece’s Independent Power Transmission Operator (ADMIE, or IPTO) is involved in the Great Sea Interconnector. Cooperation on electricity would make the most economic sense in the short term, given the huge electricity capacity issues on both sides of the island and the risk of summer blackouts. Nevertheless, it still involves a significant change in mindset by the Greek Cypriots, who might not entirely trust Greece in this matter.”
What is the issue with interconnectors?
For some background, the Great Sea Interconnector involves sending an under-water electricity cable from Crete in Greece to Cyprus, and then eventually to Israel. It would mean that Cyprus would finally be physically connected to the European grid, as all other EU countries are. At the same time, Turkey would like to send a submarine electricity cable to northern Cyprus. Turkey is physically connected to the European grid but is only an observer member of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are full members of ENTSO-E.
My understanding is that, if Turkey wants to add another electrical connection, for example to northern Cyprus, it must get permission from ENTSO-E members. My understanding is also that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have refused or de facto refused such permission. If Turkey sends a cable to northern Cyprus without permission, ENTSO-E rules dictate that it would have to be mono-directional: from Turkey to northern Cyprus only. It is not clear that everyone involved has understood the implications of locking northern Cyprus into a mono-directional cable. A mono-directional cable would increase the Turkish Cypriots’ dependence on Turkey and would therefore not be conducive to a settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Another complicating factor is that the Great Sea Interconnector crosses the area of the maritime agreement that Turkey signed with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in November 2019. While this agreement is not recognized by Greece or the Republic of Cyprus it did not prevent a stand-off between the Greek and Turkish navies over the interconnector in July 2024.
Even before the latest media reports, which I shall outline in a moment, I feared that the instinct of the Greek Cypriots would be to reject outright any offer of cooperation from Turkey . Here, I would like to explain a little bit more why think that might be the case.
Why Turkey might not understand Greek Cypriots
I come from a fairly large country that has not been invaded for over a thousand years. That meant it took me a while to understand Greek Cypriots, whose entire history involves millennia of being overrun by successive foreign armies. That has long-term effects on a culture’s psychology. I suspect that Turkey, a big country, also has difficulty seeing how Greek Cypriots perceive things.
What do I mean? Hardly a day goes by without something in the media to make everyone scared of Turkey or to remind them that there are tens of thousands of Turkish troops stationed in northern Cyprus. If you live in Nicosia you cannot go anywhere without seeing the huge kilometres-long Turkish Cypriot and Turkish flags on the mountainside. This creates a certain mentality that means that any offer from Turkey will always be interpreted as some kind of trap. As the Americans have recently learned with their newfound relations with Cyprus, offers from big countries have to be coated with a whole lot more honey before they will be seen as attractive.
The other thing I worried about in the January report was what would happen if Turkey made an offer in March for cooperation on electricity cables but the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Would Turkey then threaten to block the Great Sea Interconnector because of the Libyan maritime agreement?
Alas, since I wrote that, reports have already emerged that Turkey could interfere in cable-laying and that this is damaging the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. The reports are a little short on detail, so should be treated with caution. But there is a risk that, if Turkey was planning to make an offer, as I suspected it might have been, the notion has died before the offer was even made.
What is the win-win for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?
That would be a pity. Because I do think that there is an opportunity for a win-win here. But because of the psychological reasons mentioned above, I believe it needs one more element for it to work.
This element is another “big player” to come on board, in order to make the Greek Cypriots more confident. I believe that that player should be Israel. In my January report, I said:
“The only way in which we believe Greek Cypriots might conceivably get comfortable with such an offer is if it also included other significant military powers, in addition to Greece, that would make Greek Cypriots feel safe—such as Israel, or the US, or potentially Egypt. Israel has the biggest interest, as it is due to be the recipient of the final leg of the Great Sea Interconnector, which will help diversify its energy sources.”
Relations between Turkey and Israel are of course rather fragile. But it is interesting that the US president, Donald Trump, is reported to have told Turkey that the US military will leave Syria—where the US has been supporting Kurdish forces—if Turkey makes up with Israel. Cooperation on electricity could be the opportunity everyone is looking for to make that happen.
But it cannot happen without some strategic flexibility on all sides. Developments in the US mean that we are all living in extremely uncertain times. Opportunities to reduce risks should not be dismissed lightly. There is a win-win formula that can bring energy, security and environmental benefits to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and Israel. We just need the imagination to grasp it.
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Energy cooperation makes absolute sense, but as you point out, it also requires trust from both sides. As well as energy, Türkiye is also bringing water to the North. That may or may not be required in the South - but I doubt any of us has too much water. So, perhaps a share of that could open the door to see us share more of what is around us so that all sides win. The alternative is that we cut off our own and each other’s noses.
For me, the most obvious choose of a third country to garner support and trust from both side has to be the United Kingdom. Especially as they will equally use the resource themselves and because they also claim rights to any hydrocarbons around Cyprus - on account of their bases actually being sovereign UK territory as opposed to just bases. They therefore also need to put something in, before they take out.
Where you totally lose me unfortunately is to suggest Israel as a potential solution. A cursory glance across the water to see what they are capable of when the mood takes them would not gain my trust. My utter disgust, yes.
Finally (and I appreciate you wrote this before the meeting and the agreement of the confidence building measures) the solar farm inside the buffer zone is great news. For an island drenched in sun, it’s madness not to profit from it.